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LIABILITY TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY
ON THE GROUND
ROBERT KINGSLEY* and SAm E. GATESt
The liability problems which face the owner or the operator
of aircraft may be classified roughly under two main heads, each
with two sub-divisions:
A. Liability to other persons engaged in aviation:
1. Liability to other aircraft, their passengers, their crew,
and/or their cargo;'
2. Liability to his own passengers, cargo and/or
crew ;2
B. Liability to persons not engaged in aviation:
1. Liability to the owner (and/or occupier) of over-flown
property (the so-called "trespass-nuisance" problem) ;3
and
2. Liability to persons and property on the ground, for
damage other than that caused by the mere passage of
the aircraft.
Courts, writers and legislators are attempting to establish the solu-
tion of these questions. While all have certain common elements,
yet, since the interests of the parties seeking redress differ widely,
it by no means follows that the arguments and principles applicable
to one of these situations can be utilized in the others.
Aviation is no longer a novelty, but is recognized by the courts
as a commercial and public enterprise 4 of such scope that judicial
*Professor of Law, University of Southern California School of Law; As-
sociate Editor, THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW.
tCarnegie Fellow in International Law, 1930-1931; Comment Editor, South-
ern California Law Review.
1. Consult: Ebrite v. Crawford, 215 Cal. 724, 12 P. (2d) 937, 1932 U. S.
Av. R. 9 (1932), adopting 67 Cal. App. Dec. 832, 5 P. (2d) 686 (1931);
Gruenke v. North American Airways Co., 201 Wis. 565, 230 N. W. 618, 1930
U. S. Av. R. 126 (1930) ; Herrick, Olsen et al. v. Curtiss Flying Service Inc.
and Byrnes, 1932 U. S. Av. R. 110 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1932), discussed in: Note,
4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 103 (1933).
2. Consult: Smith v. O'Donnell, 215 Cal. 714, 12 P. (2d) 933, 1932 U. S.
Av. R. 145 (1932), adopting 67 Cal. App. Dec. 838, 5 P. (2d) 690 (1931):
Note, 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 429 (1933), and cases there cited.
3. Consult: Kingsley and Alangham, "The Correlative Interests of the
Landowner and the Airman," 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 374 (1932).
4. Hesse v. Rath, 224 App. Div. 344, 230 N. Y. S. 676, 1928 U. S. Av. R.
315 (1928) : "We may take judicial notice of the fact that aviation is no
longer an experiment. Large sums of money have been expended and are
being expended by municipalities In providing suitable airports. Commercial
and passenger lines have been established for the transportation of passengers,
mail and express. Railroads have established schedules in connection with
[51s]
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notice will be taken of the characteristics of an airplane. Whereas
the aviator who voluntarily or involuntarily brought his craft to
earth on the land of another formerly was welcomed with en-
thusiasm and interest engendered by curiosity, his act in so doing
now is the object of indignant protest and the subject of litigation.,
Where the sole relation of aviator and landsman is that involved in
the passage of aircraft in flight, public necessity and convenience may
require the modification of the maxim cujus est solum to the limit
of "possible effective possession" ;7 but as an incident to the general
welfare is it desirable that flyers be permitted to alight upon priv-
ate premises or to drop objects thereon for mere pleasure or con-
venience or even for their own safety? Should aviation be per-
fected at the expense of those engaging in it, or should a public
only passively interested pay a share of the cost price of this new
industry? These are questions now pressing for answer and for
which it is the purpose of this article to suggest a solution.
Several rules for fixing the liability for damage caused by
aircraft might be suggested: first, a rule of absolute liability,
wherein the owner or operator of the aircraft causing the damage
will be excused only if the negligence of the injured party has
been a contributing factor; s second, a rule of absolute liability, but
with the defense of "act of God," or vis major, available;5 or
third, the ordinary rules of negligence-of torts on land-with lip-
bility dependent upon the cause of the fall. 10 The choice of one
as preferred to another possibly may be determined best by a prac-
tical consideration of existing social and economic conditions. And
this concept, expressed by Professor Hirschberg in one of the
early articles in this field of law,1' seems to have been employed
air transportation companies for the more rapid transportation of passengers
and valuable express, and the Government has availed Itself of air transporta-
tion in carrying mail."
5. Platt v. Erie Co. Agric. Soo., 164 App. Div. 99, 149 N. Y. S. 520, 1928
U. S. Av. R. 116 (1914) ; Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511,
170 N. E. 385, 1930 U. S. Av. R. 1 (1930).
6. Zollmann, Law of the Air (1927), 74.
7. Consult: Kingsley and Mangham, "The Correlative Interests of the
Landowner and the Airman," 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 374 (1932).
8. This position has been upheld in Baldwin, "Liability for Accidents
in Aerial Navigation," 9 Mich. L. Rev. 20 (1910); Bogert, "Problems In Avia-
tion Law," 6 Corn. L. Quar. 217 (1921) ; Hazeltine. The Law of the Air (1911),
86; Logan, Aircraft Law (1928), 111: Myers, "The Air and the Earth Be-
neath," 26 Green Bag 363 (1914); Newman, "Damage Liability in Aircraft
Cases," 29 Col. L. Rev. 1039 (1929) ; Spaight, Aircraft in Peace and the Law(1919), 78.
9. This rule is advocated in: MacCracken, "Air Law," 57 Am. L. Rev. 97
(1923) and Zollmann, Law of the Air (1927). c. 3.
10. Hearne, "The Liability of an Aviator for Damage to Persons and
Property on the Ground," 37 W. Va. L. Quar. 269 (1930) ; Spaight, Aircraft
in Peace and the Law (1919), 82, citing writers advocating this principle;
Tell, Comment, 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 363 (1930), discussing Gruenke v. North
American Airways, Inc., 201 Wis. 565, 230 N. W. 618, 1930 U. S. Av. R. 126(1930).
11. Hirschberg, "Liability of the Aviator," 2 So. Cal. L. Rev. 405, 423(1929) quoting: Bohlen. Studies in the Law of Torts (1926), 368: "The
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by the court in the recent case of Livingston v. Flaherty,1 2 which
case is the genesis of this article.
Text writers apparently feel that the public weal will be served
best by a rule of absolute liability, and the principle has been.in-
corporated in Section 5 of the Uniform State Law of Aeronautics,1"
which to date has been enacted in twenty-one States, and the Ter-
ritory of Hawaii. 14 The British Air Navigation Act of 1920, Sec-
tion 9, contains a similar provision,15 and absolute liability is the
basis of the laws of most of the nations of continental Europe."6
Some States accomplished the result by resorting to the general
laws, and others have enacted specific statutes. After lengthy de-
bate, the "principles of special and abnormal danger" connected
with flying led the Commission Internationale Technique des Ex-
perts Juridiques A~riens (C. I. T. E. J. A.) to propose in its first
Draft Convention Relative to Liability for Damages Caused to
Third Parties on the Surface:
"Article I. (1) Any damage caused by an aircraft in maneuvers or in
flight to persons or property on the surface shall give a right to compensa-
tion by the mere fact that the damage exists and that it has been caused
by the aircraft.
solution must depend on the existing social, political and economic conditions
and conceptions prevailing at the particular time and in the particular places,
the traditional attitude of mind and habit of thought, even the prejudices, of
the class then and there dominating public thought."
12. Superior Court of the State of California, in and for the County-of
Los Angeles, No. 329013. Decided Nov. 15, 1932, by Minor Moore, J.
13. Section 5 provides: "The owner of every craft which is operated
over lands or waters of this state is absolutely liable for injuries to persons
or property on the land or water beneath, caused by the ascent, descent, or
flight of the aircraft, or the dropping or falling of any object therefrom,
whether such owner was negligent or not, unless the injury is caused in whole
or In part by the negligence of the person injured, or the owner or bailee of
the property injured. If the aircraft is leased at time of the injury to per-
son or property, both owner oi: lessee shall be liable, and they may be sued
jointly, or either or both of them may be sued separately .
It is to be noted that the sole defense available is that of the contributory
negligence of the party injured.
14. Ariz. Laws (1929), c. 38; Del. Laws (1923), c. 199 ; Idaho Code (1932),
§§21-101-21-110; Ind. Burn's Stat. (1929 supp.), §§3843.1-3843.12; Md. Bag-
by's Code (1929 supp.), Art. 1-A; Mich. Comp. Laws (1929), §§4811-4821;
Minn. Mason's Stats. (1931 supp.), §§5494-7-5494-21; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1929),
§§13905-13915; Mont. Laws (1929), c. 17; Nev. Comp. Laws (1929), §§275-
288; N. J. Com. Stat. (1930 supp.), §§15-21-15-34; N. C. Code (1931),
§§191(j)-191(w) ; N. D. Comp. Laws (1925 supp.), §§2971cl-2971c12; Penn.
Stat. (1929), §§1421-1429; R. I. Laws (1929), c. 145; S. C. Code (1932),
§§7100-7111; S. D. Comp. Laws (1929), §§8666L-8666W; Tenn. Code (1932),
§§2716-2726; Utah Laws (1923), c. 24; Vt. Laws (1923), Act 1155; Wis. Stat.
(1931), §§114.01-114.10; Hawaii Rev. Laws (1925), §§3891-3905.
15. 10 & 11 Geo. V, c. 80, sec. 9 ([1920] L. R. Stat. 540, 544). Section 9
provides: ". . . where material damage or loss is caused by an aircraft in
flight, taking off, or landing, or by any person in any such aircraft,, to any
person or property on land or water, damages shall be recoverable from the
owner of the aircraft in respect of such damage or loss, without proof of
negligence or intention or other cause of action, as though the same had been
caused by his wilful act, neglect or default, except where the damage or loss
was caused by or contributed to by the negligence of the person by whom
the same was suffered....."
16. Bulgaria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Hungary, Germany, Austria.
Italy, Danzig, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, France, Denmark, Norway and Russia.
Algeria and Venezuela have adopted similar statutes. Consult: Hirschberg,
"Liability of the Aviator," 2 So. Cal. L. Rev. 405, 410, 422 & 426 (1926);
Note, 4 JOURNAL OF AIa LAw 411 (1933).
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"(2) This liability may be reduced or avoided only in case the in-
jured person is at fault and in accordance with the provisions of the law
of the court before which the case is brought."'17
The objections of several of the nations involved led the Com-
mission, in its 1932 draft, to restrict the amount of this liability
to the original value of the aircraft involved (but not less than
two and one-half million gold francs)18-but the absolute charac-
ter of the liability was left unchanged.19
In 1931 the Committee on Aeronautical Law of the American
Bar Association presented for the consideration of that body a
new "Uniform Aeronautical Code," designed to supersede the older
Uniform State Law of Aeronautics. The proposed new code
squarely rejected the doctrine of liability without fault and placed
liability solely on the basis of negligence, with, however, the im-
portant practical qualification that the happening of the injury
should be prima facie evidence of such negligence. 20 The pro-
posed new code differed from the older laws in other particulars 2'
and in 1932 the Committee announced that, as a result of a com-
promise 2 with the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, it had
receded from its position on liability-suggesting a revised code
which, once more, imposed a liability without fault, but which
materially restricted the cases in which the legal "owner"-as dis-
tinguished from the "operator"--of the craft was subject to such
liability.23 No final approval of either of these proposals was asked,
17. The Draft Convention in its proposed form will be found In 4 JOURNAL
or AIR LAW 97 (1933).
18. Article 4. The proposed draft contains, also, provisions providing
for the giving of security by the persons responsible and imposing an unlimited
liability in cases of fault or of failure to post the reqiuired security. For a
discussion of the history of the draft, consult: Muller, "The C. I. T. E. J. A.
and Liability Toward Third Persons on the Surface," 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
235 (1933).
19. This convention was revised at a meeting in Rome, May 29, 1933,
which made some changes in phraseology but did not change the essential
character of the provisions discussed in the text. For a translation of the
convention adopted, see page 567 of this issue.
20. "Section 6. Damage to Persons and Property on the Ground. Proof
of injury inflicted to Persons or property on the ground by the operation of
any aircraft, or by objects falling or thrown therefrom, shall be prima facie
evidence of negligence on the part of the operator of such aircraft in refer-
ence to such injury." 56 Rep. Am. Bar Assn. 329 (1931).
21. Principally with reference to the "right of flight."
22. "The section referred to, . . . in which absolute liability is im-
posed in some instances, was a matter of, if you please, political expediency, a
compromise, to get a bill agreed upon." ;George B. Logan, in 57 Rep. Am. Bar
Assn. 142 (1932).
23. "Section 5. Damage to Persons and Property on the Ground. The
owner of every aircraft which is operated over the lands or waters of this
state is absolutely liable for injuries to persons or property on the land or
water beneath, caused by the ascent, descent or flight of the aircraft, or the
dropping or falling of any object therefrom, whether such owner was neg-
ligent or not, unless the injury is caused in whole or in part by the negligence
of the person injured or of the owner, lessee, or bailee of the property damaged.
"As used in this section, 'owner' shall include a person having full title
to aircraft and operating. it through servants, and shall also include a bona
fide lessee or bailee of such aircraft, whether gratuitously or for hire, but
'owner,' as used in this section, shall not include a bona fide bailor or lessor
of such aircraft, whether gratuitously or for hire, or a mortgagee, conditional
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the Committee merely reporting its actions. In 1933 the Committee
once more declared that some progress with respect to its work
on the Code had been accomplished, but asked leave to defer its
final conclusion thereon until after it had had an opportunity
further to consider the actions of the C. I. T. E. J. A. at its meet-
ing in Rome in 1933.24
While all of these attempts to settle the problem of third party
liability seem to indicate a definite trend toward the invocation of
a rule of absolute liability, still the persistence of activity relative
to the topic, the absence of any general definitive adoption of the
modern proposals,25 and the tendency of the courts, as shown
by the cases discussed later, to ground their decisions in general
rules of negligence, make a new examination on the basis of prin-
ciple and practicality particularly pertinent.
As a preliminary matter, it should be pointed out that the form
in which the absolute liability doctrine was enunciated in the old
Uniform State Law of Aeronautics 26 did not afford a complete
solution in consonance with established principles of justice for all
cases in which third persons on the surface might be injured by
aircraft.27  Under that statement of the rule, the liability for in-
jury was imposed upon the "owner" in every instance, even though
the plane at the time of the accident were in the possession of a
thief. The more modern statements, in the current drafts of the
C. I. T. E. J. A. convention 2 and the new Aeronautical Code 21
have removed this inequality, placing the liability on the person for
whose economic advantage the aircraft was being operated. But
this correction of an obvious inequity does not affect the major
and fundamental question of whether or not an absolute liability
(whether limited or unlimited as to the amount recoverable)
should be imposed on, anyone. There still remains the considera-
tion of those instances in which the act complained of was the
result of a force wrongfully set in motion by the act or omission'
seller, trustee for creditors, of such aircraft, or other persons having a
security title only; nor shall the owner of such aircraft be liable when the
operator thereof Is in possession as a result of theft or felonious conversion."
24. Adv. Program, 56th Annual Meeting, Am. Bar Assn., 39.
25. But note that Georgia has adopted the "Aeronautical Code" in the
form in which it was first proposed in 1931. Ga. Laws (1933), Act. 206,
p. 99.
26. Supra, footnote No. 13.
27. Consult: Hearne, "The Liability of an Aviator for Damage to Per-
sons and Property on the Ground," 37 W. Va. L. Quar. 269 (1930).
28. Article 3 provides: "(1) The liability contemplated in the preceding
articles shall attach to the operator of the aircraft, subject to his recourse
against the author of the damage; (2) Any person who makes use of the
aircraft on his own accouit shall be considered operator of the aircraft; (3)
In case the name of the operator is not Inscribed on the aeronautical register
or any other official document, the owner shall be considered to be the opera-
tor until proof to the contrary is submitted." 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 97-98
(1933) (italics added).
29. Supra, footnote No. 23.
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of a third party, e. g., a collision in mid-air due to the negligence
of another aviator; the case where the aviator wilfully lands on
private premises to avoid collision with another plane; 'those cases
where natural forces, or other causes not based on negligence, viz.,
"act of God," vis major, or latent defects which cannot be dis-
covered by reasonable inspection, cause the plane to come crashing
to earth; and cases of injuries attributable to a "forced landing"
or the overthrowing of ballast, where no element of negligence on
the part of the aviator is involved.30 If the proximate cause of
the act complained of is the wrongful act or omission of a third
party, an "act of God" or vis major, it is submitted that the aviator
should no more be held to absolute liability than should the operator
of any other mechanical device. Where, however, latent defects
are responsible, or where the aviator makes a "forced landing" on
the premises of another, since the aviator has made the accident
possible it would seem reasonable to impose liability upon him
through the application of the maxim sic utero tue in the first
classification and a rule of "incomplete privilege" in the latter.81
Logically, there would seem to be more reason for applying a
rule of absolute liability to the owners and operators of balloons
than to the pilots of airplanes, for, as noted by the court in the
early case of Guille v. Swan,82 "the aeronaut had no control over
its [the balloon's] motion horizontally; he is at the sport of the
winds, and is to descend where and how he can; his reaching the
earth is a matter of hazard." Accordingly, Guille was held to the
same liability for damages incidental in his descent in Swan's gar-
den and the consequent trampling of the crops by curiosity seekers
who rushed to the balloonist's assistance, as though the balloon had
been under his control, and he had guided it into Swan's garden.s3
In fact, as pointed out below, when dealing with ariplanes the
courts have almost invariably resorted to the rules of torts on
land, and a number of states by legislative enactment have made
the rules of torts on land applicable to aircraft.84
30. Consult: Hearne. "Liability of an Aviator for Damage to Persons
and Property on the Ground." 37 W. Va. L. Quar. 269, 274-275 & 278 (1930).
31. Ploo] v. Putnam. 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188, 20 L. R. A. [n. s.] 152, 130
Am. St. Rep. 1072, 15 Ann. Cas. 1151 (1908); Vincent v. Lakd Erie Transp.
Co.. 109 Minn. 456, 124 N. W. 221, 27 L. R. A. [n. s.] 312 (1910); Bohlen,
"Incomplete Privilege," 39 Harv. L. Rev. 307 (1926).
82. 19 Johns. 381. 383, 10 Am. Dec. 234, 1928 U. S. Av. R. 53 (N. Y.
1822).
33. Consult on this point: Pollock, Torts (8th ed.), 39.
34. Penn. Laws (1929). Act. 317, and Idaho Laws (1931), c. 41, apply
the rule of torts on land to aircraft; Ariz. Laws (1929), c. 38. and Conn.
Public Acts (1929), c. 253, impose absolute liability in cases where the pilot
Is negligent: R. I. Laws (1929), c. 1435, establishes absolute liability of the owner
unless the plane is in the possession of a lessee, and in such case the owner
Is only liable for negligence; under S. C. Laws (1929), Act. 189, and Wis.
Laws (1929), c. 348, the owner and lessee are jointly liable but only to the
extent of their own negligence.
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The principle of absolute liability finds its roots in the opin-
ion of Lord Blackburn in Rylands v. Fletcher.5
"The person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects
and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it
there at his peril, and if he does not do so, he is prima facie answerable for
all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. He can
excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiff's de-
fault or perhaps that the escape was the consequence of vis major, or the
act of God . .. .
Absolute liability is an outgrowth of the concept of the ab-
solute protection of private property, whereby one who trespassed
on the lands of another was liable irrespective of intent, negligence
or accident.3 6 Modern, jurisprudence, however, has tended to re-
quire the intent or fault element before liability can be established
and to deny recovery to anyone who has been the victim of a
"pure" accident. If, in arriving at the conclusion of the court in
Rylands v. Fletcher, there was a consideration of any fault element,
the fault must have been one occurring prior to the actual accident,
i. e., the negligent act must have been that of the accumulation
of the potentially dangerous thing on the land and not its escape
therefrom. 7 It is submitted that an airplane does not "escape"
onto the land of another unless it is, or was at the time of leaving
the ground on its flight, under human control; no more than an
automobile does it have the inherent power of doing harm, for so
long as it remains stationary it is harmless. 8 Since the mere owner-
ship or operation of an airplane or of an automobile cannot be
construed within themselves to constitute wrongful conduct, to fix
liability for damage sustained by virtue of such ownership or op-
eration there must be something more-some act or omission com-
parable to the accumulation of a thing "likely to do mischief if it
escapes" found to be present in Rylands v. Fletcher.
It has been argued with some force that the doctrine espoused
in Rylands v. Fletcher is not applicable in the case of movable
chattels.33 Lord Blackburn, in writing his opinion, distinguished
35. L. R. 3 I. L. 330 (1868).
36. Consult: Hirschberg, "Liability of the Aviator," 2 So. Cal. L. Rev.
405, 407-408 (1929).
37. Consult: McNair, The Law of the Air (1932), 54.
38. McNair, The Law of the Air (1932), 63.
39. McNair, The Law of the Air (1932), 55, citing Baron Parke inQuorman v. Barnett. 6 M. & W. 510 (1840). Butt, J.. In The European, 10
P. D. 99 (1885), citing Tarry v. Ashton, 1 Q. B. Div. 314 (1876), said: "Those
[where defendants were bound to manage their property so as not to Injure
other persons, negligence or no negligence] are cases where the defendants
were persons in possession of real property, and with reference to them the
rule of law seems to be that they must take care that their property is so
used or managed that other persons are not Injured, and that, whether their
property be managed by themselves or their servants. The same rule does
not apply to the use or management of moveable chattels."
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between cases where one collected a potentially dangerous instru-
mentality upon his property and those where damage was done to
the person or personalty by collision on land or sea, in which latter
case the proof of negligence is essential, by stating:
"Traffic on the highways, whether by land or sea, cannot be conducted
without exposing those whose persons or property are near it to some
inevitable risk; and that being so those who go upon the highway, or have
their property adjacent to it may well be held to do so subject to their
taking upon themselves the risk of injury from that inevitable danger ...
In neither case, therefore, can they recover without proof of want of care
or skill occasioning the accident .
As pointed out by Lord Justice Fletcher Moulton in Wing v.
London General Omnibus Company,4 0 before the rule of absolute
liability might be applied in fixing the responsibility of a motor
transit company for injuries inflicted upon one of its passengers,
it was incumbent upon the plaintiff
"to prove that this particular motor omnibus was or that motor omnibuses
generally were unmanageable, or dangerous, to such an extent as to con-
stitute a nuisance in the eye of the law, or to call into play the doctrine
of Rylands v. Fletcher. For the reason I have already given, the mere
occurrence of the accident is not evidence of negligence much less of the
more difficult issue of nuisance, and beyond this there was no relevant evi-
dence of any kind......
The reasons advanced in favor of applying the doctrine of
absolute liability in cases involving injury 'by aircraft to third per-
sons and property on the ground are: (a) the helplessness of
persons on land to avoid injury ;41 (b) the dangerous character of
aviation-that an airplane is inherently dangerous and that the
safety of flight is dependent upon factors beyond human control ;42
and (c) the practical impossibility of the injured party's proving
40. [1909] 2 K. B. 652, 666.
41. A Report of the British Aerial Transport Committee, 146 L. T. 106
(1918), stated: "Persons on land are practically powerless to insure their
own safety by precautionary measures against damage caused by the fall of
aircraft or objects carried therein."
In discussing the first proposed Aeronautical Code, at the meeting of the
American Bar Association in 1931, General Nathan W. MacChesney placed
his preference for the absolute liability doctrine on the following basis: "The
fact of the case is that the man upon whose head something Is dropped
from an airplane, in his office or upon his front porch or lawn, has not sought
out that contact, has not been a party to it in any way, and the person who
has been the cause of it, regardless of fault, might well be held to a higher
degree of responsibility than where the person injured has gotten on some
conveyance, for instance." 56 Rep. Am. Bar Assn. 88-89 (1931).
42. Baldwin. "Liability for Accidents in Aerial Navigation," 9 Mich. L.
Rev. 20, 22 (1910) ; Myer8, "The Air and The Earth Beneath," 26 Green Bag
363, 365 (1914) ; Zollmann. Law of the Air (1927), c. 3, p. 71. An illustrative
expression is that taken from Baldwin. "Liability for Damages in Aerial Navi-
gation." 9 Mich. L. Rev. 20 22: "The thing [an airplane which has fallen on
the house of a third partyl was, while in the air, inherently and continually
a menace to the security of everything beneath it. It was a danger to all
men as well as to the property of all men."
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what has caused the accident. 43 Examined in the light of a highly
mechanized society, these arguments lose much of their force, and
it is believed that existing rules of law afford an adequate remedy
to the injured landsman. As noted above, the rule of Rylands v.
Fletcher is inapplicable to movable chattels, and the inability of a
person on the ground to avoid injury from an airplane differs only
in degree from the ability of a pedestrian to avoid injury from
an uncontrolled automobile. In either instance, it must be assumed
that the operator no longer has control of the instrumentality. The
question as to whether the airplane is an inherently dangerous in-
strumentality is purely factual and the argument lacks merit when
it is discovered that during the period from July to December, 1932,
there was only one accident to every 547,178 miles flown in sched-
uled air transport service.4 4 Nor can the writers agree with those
who contend that the safety of aviation is subject to the whims of
nature, i. e., wind, fog, electrical and snow storms, et cetera, and
that a multitudinous number of undetermined causes may. bring
a plane crashing to earth or compel a "forced landing." Detailed
statistics as to the causes of accidents are not available, nor would
they necessarily be conclusive. Government meteorological stations
provide frequent weather reports forecasting, with reasonable ac-
curacy, flying and atmospheric conditions; "two-way" radio com-
nunication furnishes a means for constant checking of advance
weather conditions and other needed data; radio controlled beacon's
and beam landing devices remove other dangers attributed to the
forces of nature. Furthermore, it is believed that careful inspec-
tion of the aircraft before each flight would eliminate most of the
accidents now attributed to the so-called structural and mechanical
defects. As to the third reason-the practical impossibility of
showing the cause of the accident-the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
would seem to be a complete answer. If these conclusions be cor-
rect, then the principles of law applicable to torts on land-the
rules of negligence and proximate cause-might well be employed
in the field of aviation.
Indeed, a consideration of the cases involving this problem
of law indicates that, almost universally, they have been determined
by the application of these principles. The case of Livingston v.
Flaherty,5 recently decided in the Superior Court of the State of
California for Los Angeles County, serves as an illustration of
43. Newman, "Damage Liability in Aircraft Cases," 29 Col. L. Rev. 1039,
1041 (1929), and authorities there cited.
44. 4 Air Comm. Bul. 418 (March 1, 1933).
45. Supra, footnote No. 12.
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the result to be obtained when a court adheres to the aforemen-
tioned tenets--a result consonant with the principles of equity and
justice. Couched in rhetoric worthy of Milton or Carlisle, the
conclusion of the court appears both logical and sound. Briefly,
the facts were these:
Defendant Flaherty, a licensed air pilot, left a Los Angeles
suburban airport late in the afternoon for the purpose of flying to
a desert ranch some ninety miles to the east, there to engage in a
deer hunting expedition. He had pre-arranged with his host
to have a lighted landing field to guide him in alighting.
Due either to inattention or to obscurity caused by haze, the
defendant flew too far to the left, missed the entrance to San
Gorgonio Pass and found himself in Morongo Valley in total
darkness. Flaherty circled the valley a number of times at an
elevation of one thousand feet. From this height he observed
plaintiff's husband (Livingston) leave his home with a light and
proceed out on to the desert. When the light finally remained
stationary, the defendant interpreted it as an invitation to land.
While the plane was in the process of landing and about three
hundred feet from the ground, the plaintiff's husband suddenly
started to run towards the course of the plane. As the plane
touched the ground, Livingston was struck 'by the left wing and
killed. The plaintiff (widow of deceased) brought an action for
wrongful death, and the defendant contended that the deceased
invited him to land, and that he (deceased) voluntarily assumed
the risk by placing himself in a position of danger. The court
held the defendant to be liable. Apparently it applied the rules
of torts on land, and took into consideration the cause of the
descentS, ir declaring: that the defendant was engaged in a
dangerous undertaking; that under the circumstances he had not
exercised the care of the ordinary prudent man in attempting
to make such a landing; that it was not a "forced landing"; that
one's life and property are not to be endangered by another's
use of a dangerous device; and that the defendant had the last
clear chance to avoid the injury.46
46. The following are a few illustrative excerpts from the opinion:
"Any instrument which can be carried into the air and which If not
guided by Intelligence, may drop from the air upon the person or the property
of another, is itself too dangerous to undertake to land upon private premises
without prearrangement and without every precaution to avoid destruction of
property or of life."
"Every operator of an airplane knows the likelihood of loss of control
of his plane: the hazards in landing; the loss of wings in flight, and a myriad
of other accidents which may happen from the moment of taking off to the
moment of successful descent."
"The defendant here was bent upon a pleasure-seeking excursion into a
desert community. He arrived in the night-time where no landing-place was
provided. Instead of leaving the valley and returning to some equipped air-
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That the general rules governing torts on land will be ap-
plied in aviation cases was the effect, likewise, of the recent case
of Gruenke v. North American Airways, Inc., 47 where the court
had before it the problem of the degree of caution to be exer-
cised by an aviator in landing a plane so as to exempt him from
liability for damages to a second plane stalled on a runway.
The upper court held that the trial judge had committed prej-
udicial error in instructing the jury that "West [the pilot] was to
use the highest degree of care that men of reasonable vigilance
and foresight ordinarily exercise in the practical conduct and
operation of an airplane and making a landing," and declared
that West was required to exercise only ordinary care.4 8  In
short, the court held that the rules applicable to torts on land
were controlling.
Ordinary care has been defined as that degree of care which
people of ordinarily prudent habits-people in general-reason-
ably could be expected to exercise under any particular given
circumstances. 41 Reasonable or ordinary care is always a rela-
tive term, varying according to the circumstances of a particular
case ;50 and the nature of the undertaking in which the party
sought to be charged was engaged, 51 as well as the nature and
characteristics of the instrumentality used,5 2 must be considered.
More vigilance and caution are required in the doing of acts at
a place where injury may be anticipated, 53 and a person engaging
in an act which the circumstances indicate may be dangerous
must take all the care which prudence would suggest to avoid
injury.5 4  Care must be proportioned to the danger to be avoided
port, he beguiled himself into the delusion that the solitary homesteader with
his lantern by his side would be a facility sufficient to direct him to a saf6landing. He had confidence in his power of control, but he lacked knowledge
of the terrain."
"To land with a plane of fifty or sixty feet in width, within the radius
of the rays from a lantern on such land and under such circumstances, was
an undertaking that was foolhardy and the fruit of a thoughtless enterprise.
He did not guard against the destruction of life or property with such care
as tlat ordinarily exercised by a prudent person."
"Upon the principle that one's life and property are not to be imperiled
by another's use, of his own dangerous device by direct injury, then the de-fendant must be liable for taking the life of the deceased under the circum-
stances revealed by this case."
"When defendant saw deceased at the distance of more than three hundred
feet away, running toward the course of the plane, he knew the deceased
was in a position of danger and If he was conscious of such danger, he knew
that it was imprudent to land under such circumstances."
47. 201 Wis. 565, 230 N. W. 618, 1930 U. S. Av. R. 126 (1930).
48. Consult: Tell, 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 363 (1930), for a comment on
this case.
49. Hoff v. Los Angeles Pacific Co., 158 Cal. 596, 112 P. 53 (1910) ; Chi-
cago, Milw. d St. P. RY. v. Moore, 166 F. 663, 23 L. R. A. En. s.] 962 (C. C. A.
8th 1909).
50. Henderson v. Los Angeles Traction Co., 150 Cal. 689, 89 P. 976 (1907)
Caven v. Bodwell Granite Co., 99 Me. 278. 59 A. 285 (1904).
51. Brand v. Schnectady, etc., T. R. R., 8 Barb. 368 (N. Y. 1850).
52. Wethe v. Rathien Mercantile Co., 34 Cal. App. 302, 167 P. 287 (1917).
53. Indianapolis Union Ry. v. Boetteher, 131 Ind. 82, 28 N. E. 551 (1891).
54. McGrew v. Stone, 53 Pa. 436 (1866).
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and the consequences reasonably tq be anticipated from such
conduct," and where death may be caused by an agency law-
fully in use, ordinary care requires that every known means be
used to prevent it. 56  "The ultimate and controlling test of the
exercise of reasonable care is, not what has been the practice of
others in like situations, but what a reasonably prudent person
would ordinarily have done in such a situation.""7
To be specific, the amount of caution required to meet the
measure of "ordinary care" demanded of an owner or operator
of an aircraft will necessarily be greater than that required of
the owner or operator o an automobile or of a locomotive.
"You will have to remember that in dealing with travel by air-
plane you are dealing with a kind of transportation which is
navigating a new element. There are many more factors which
are unknown, unforseeable and not preventable arising in con-
nection with an airplane journey than with a railroad journey.
APis an example, the weather is a most vital and important con-
sideration in the piloting and management of airplanes, and
whereas it may play some part in connection with the running of
railroad trains, it certainly plays a very minor role." 5   However,
it must also be remembered that those who utilize aircraft as a
means of transportation have at their disposal the latest and most
complete scientific developments to guard against these "factors."
"Ordinary care" requires the use of these facilities, and one who
does use them has satisfied its demands.
By virtue of the application of the foregoing well-established
rules of law, a fair association which neglected to provide ade-
quate safeguards for the spectators around the landing field was
held liable for injuries received by a child who was struck by the
wing of an airplane," and an agricultural society was held respons-
ible to a patron who was caught by the rope of an ascending bal-
loon when it was shown that the society had failed to erect bar-
riers around the balloon.60 Likewise, an amusement company has
been held liable for injuries caused by the 'breaking of a cleat used
55. Fairbairn v. American River Elec. Co., 170 Cal. 115, 148 P. 788
(1915).
56. 'White v. Red Mountain Fruit Co., 186 Cal. 335, 199 P. 318 (1921).
57. Chicago, Milw. d St. P. Ry. v. Moore. 166 IF. 663, 668, 23 L. R. A.
[N. s.] 962 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909). For a discussion of degrees of care, con-
sult: Ell4ott, "Degrees of Negligence," 6 So. Cal. L. Rev. 91 (1933).
58. Kirkpatrick, J., in Law v. Transcontinental Air Transport, Inc., 1931
U. S. Av. R. 205, 209 (D. C. Pa. 1931).
59. Platt V. Erie County Agric. Soc., 164 App. Div. 99, 149 N. Y. S. 520,
1928 U. S. Av. R. 116 (1914).
60. Roper v. Ulster County Agric. Soc., 136 App. Div. 97, 120 N. Y. S. 644,
1928 U. S. Av. R. 102 '(1909).
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to anchor a balloon,6 ' and a street railway company which engaged
a balloonist for advertising purposes has been held responsible for
the death of a boy resulting from the fall of one of the poles used
to steady the balloon.6 2  Still another case was one in which the
plaintiff sought to recover from the Wisconsin State Board of Agri-
culture for injuries received in an accident caused by an airplane
which had been- engaged by the Board for public exhibition pur-
poses. There it was decided that, in the absence of any showing
of negligence on the part of the members of the Board, there was
no individual liability; and further, that there could be no liability
because the State Board was a governmental agency engaged in
the pursuit of a governmental function.68
In at least two cases, courts have refused to permit recovery
by a plaintiff on the grounds that there was evidence that the in-
jured party was guilty of contributory negligence. In Burns v. Her-
man,6 4 a fair association was excused from liability for the death
of a spectator who had left his seat in the grand stand after the
scheduled balloon races had been called off by the manager, and
who, after urging the balloonist to ascend, assisted in the prepara-
tions for flight and was struck by a falling pole used to 'support the
balloon. In a suit to recover for injuries sustained 'by a plaintiff
when his foot was caught in the dangling ropes of a balloon, the
lower North Carolina court granted a nonsuit on the theory that
the plaintiff had been guilty of contributory negligence in respond-
ing to the call of an attendant to "help hold this balloon" without
heeding the public warning of danger.6 15
The problem of the liability of the owner of an airplane for
damage caused by the fall of his plane upon the property of an-
other seems to have been presented in only a few American cases.
In Kirschner v. Jones and White,16 judgment was entered against
the defendants for damages sustained when their plane crashed
into the plaintiff's house. However, in two other cases, Sysack v.
61. Peckett V. Bergen Beach Co., 44 App. Div. 559, 60 N. Y. S. 966, 1928
U. S. Av. R. 99 (1899).
62. Richmond d M. Ry. v. Moore, 94 Va. 493, 27 S. E. 70, 37 L. R. A. 258,
2 Am. Neg. Rep. 473, 1928 U. S. Av. R. 86 (1897).
63. Morrison v. MacLaren, 160 Wis. 621, ]52 N. W. 475, L. R. A. 1915 E,
469, 1928 U. S. Av. R. 126 (1915).
64. 48 Colo. 359, 113 P. 310, 1928 U. S. Av. R. 108 (1910). In an unre-
ported New York case, Read v. N. Y_ City Airport, Inc., decided in the N. Y.
Municipal court, August 29, 1932, and commented on in 4 Air Law Rev. 92(1933), and in.4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 276 (1933), the negligence of plaintiff's
agent was held to be a bar to recovery. The court stated, "The rules of law
applicable to torts generally govern in this type of cases."
65. Smith v. ?umberland County Agric. Soc., 163 N. C. 346, 79 S. E. 632,
Ann. Cas. 1915B, 544, 1928 IT. S. Av. R. 112 (1913). (The supreme court
reversed the order on the ground that the question of the existence of con-
tributory negligence should have gone to the jury.) .
66. 1932 U. S. Av. R. 278 (Sup. Ct. N. J. 1932).
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De Lisser Air Service Corporation,6 7 where the plaintiff's house
was struck by one of the defendant's planes, and Johnson v. Curtiss
N. W. Airplane Co.,0 8 where the defendant's airplane became un-
manageable and fell on the plaintiff's lawn, the exact problem was
not presented before the court, for in each case the plaintiff sought
to enjoin the defendant from operating planes over his premises
in the future. In the New York case, the complaint was dismissed,
and in the latter case, the Minnesota court refused the injunctive
relief on the ground that public interest justified the use of the
upper air spaces in the absence of any showing of a substantial
injury to the private property owner.6 9 Much the same conclu-
sion was reached in Smith v. New England Aircraft Company
Inc.,7 0 where the court felt that the damage proved was insufficient
to justify injunctive relief on the ground of nuisance. At the same
time, in a somewhat similar case, a federal court held that the
causing of dust in substantial and annoying quantities and the
dropping of circulars which fell upon and littered plaintiff's land
were nuisances, and could properly be enjoined. 71
If an airplane is so negligently operated as to collide with an
automobile travelling along the public highway, the owner should
be held responsible for injuries sustained by the occupants of the
motor vehicle, even though the airplane should chance to be under
control of a state officer engaged in state business.7 2 Upon the
same theory, a traveller along the highway is entitled to recover
for injuries received when an abandoned balloon used for ex-
hibition purposes fell upon the plaintiff, 3 for a reasonably prudent
man can foresee the'probability of just such an accident under the
circumstances.
The rulings of the American courts on this problem seem to
accord with the decisions of the continental tribunals. The case of
Borch v. A/S Fredrikstad Forende Teglverker74 involved a factual
situation comparable to Guille v. Swan, and the Norwegian court,
67. 1931 U. S. Av. R. 7 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1931).
68. 1928 U. S. Av. R. 42 (Dist. Ct. Minn. 1923).
69. The court said, "True, there is some danger from this source [falling
airplanes] but such accidents are infrequent, and this hazard is infinitely less
than is constantly encountered in every walk of life from various other causes.
An occasional accident has never been considered a sufficient reason for sup-
pressing a useful industry, but may justify reasonable legislative regulation."
70. 270 Mass. 511. 170 N. E. 385, 1930 U. S. Av. R. 1 (19.0).
71. Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 65 F. (2d) 201, 1932 U. S. Av. R.
1 (C. C. A. 6th 1931), modifying 41 F. (2d) 929, 1930 U. S. Av. R. 21 (D. C.
Ohio, 1930).
72. Sollack v. State of New York. 1929 U. S. Av. R. 42 (Ct. CI. N. Y.
1927).
73. Canney v. Rochester Agric. & Mech. Assn., 76 N. H. 603, 79 A. 517,
1928 U. S. Av. R. 105 (1911).
74. Norsk Retstidende for 1925 (Norway), translated and reported in 2
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 433 (1931). A similar case is reported in Scotland:
Scott's Trustees v. Moss, 17 Ct. of Sessions (4th series) 32 (1899).
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after finding that the defendants' agent had been negligent per-
mitted the plaintiff to recover for damage caused to its factory by
the fall of the defendants' plane and the assembling of crowds after
the crash. In keeping with this decision is the decision of a French
court holding the owner of an airdome liable for damage done
adjoining fields by his airplanes."'
Closely akin to these problems of liability for damage result-
ing from actual contact with the airplane is that relative to dam-
age resulting from the fright occasioned animals, and the conse-
quent injury to person or property. In Neiswonger v. Goodyear
Tire and Rubber Company,76 a federal court held that flight below
five hundred feet, which caused plaintiff's team to become fright-
ened and run away, thereby injuring plaintiff, was actionable neg-
ligence. On the other hand, a Nebraska court refused to permit
recovery for fright to foxes resulting in the abortion and destruc-
tion of their young, alleged to have been caused by the defendant's
negligently flying close to the fox farm, 77 and the United States
Comptroller General has rendered an opinion to the effect that
where an army plane, flying low over a pasture field and landing
on adjacent property, causes cattle to stampede with a resultant
shrinkage in weight, there can be no recovery, for it is an "acci-
dental happening for which there is no liability in damages. '7 8
It is submitted that the present rules of negligence and proxi-
mate cause applicable to torts on land have given the injured party
an adequate remedy in all cases in the field of aviation as yet pre-
sented to the courts. Until more valid reasons are suggested, to
impose a rule of absolute liability on the owners and operators
of aircraft for damage to third persons and property on the ground
would work an unnecessary hardship on the aviation industry.
The aviator, as much as any other alleged tort feasor, should have
available the pleas of "act of God," vis major, or the wrongful
act or omission of a third party. Undoubtedly, there will continue
to be, as there have been in the past, cases where the defendant
should be required to go forward with the evidence through the
invocation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Then, if there be
those cases where the aviator wilfully lands on the property of an-
75. Bertrand, Brinquant, Mauge. et al. v. Soctdtd Farman, 3 Revue Jurl-dique Int. do la Locomotion Airienne, 282 (Tribune civil de la Seine, 1912),discussed in: 24 Juridical Rev. 321 (1913).
76. 35 F. (2d) 761, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 96 (D. C. Ohio 1929).77. Nebraska Silver Fox Corp. V. Boeing Air Transport, Inc., 1932 U. S.Av. R. 164 (D. C. Neb. 1931). The court held that there was insufficient
evidence to Justify the finding of any substantial damage to the foxes oc-
casioned by fright.78. Cattle Frlghined by Airplane, 3 Comp. Gen. 234, 1928 U. S. Av. R.
46 (1923).
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other, either because of a "forced landing," or for reasons of pleas-
ure or convenience, as in Livingston v. Flaherty,7 the aviator
should be liable in damages for all of the natural and proximate
consequences of his act. Necessity may justify an entry upon the
land of another in order to save human life,80 property rights may
be suspended by forces beyond human control, but where one de-
liberately chooses to invade the rights of another in order to save
his own life or property, just compensation should be made."
Society has an interest in saving human life and property from de-
struction, but its only concern with the cost of salvage is that it
should be put upon him who, as between individuals concerned,
should bear it. As between the individuals concerned, it is ob-
viously just that he whose interests are advanced by the act should
bear the cost of doing it rather than that he should be permitted
to impose upon one who derives no benefit from the act.
As stated by Professor Bohlen, in his article on "Incomplete
Privilege" :82
. . . For the purpose of saving life or property from destruction,
an act may be so far privileged as to deprive the person whose interest
is invaded or threatened with invasion of the privilege which he would
otherwise have to terminate or prevent the invasion and to preclude lia-
bility for the mere harmless invasion of the right of the owner to the ex-
clusive possession of his property, but that it is not so far privileged as
to relieve him from liability to pay for any material harm that he does
thereby. This privilege may be described as incomplete. . . . An act
intended to invade another's legally protected interests is privileged only
if done to protect or advance some public interest or an interest of the
actor. If the act done is only for the protection of one of the actor's
interests, it must be an interest of value greater than, or at least equal to,
that of the interest invaded, or if the interests are similar, the harm which
the act is appropriate to prevent must be substantially equal to or greater
than that which it is intended or likely to cause."
The imposition of such principles of liability, it is believed,
would afford the most equitable and the fairest solution to our
problem, affording to both landowner and aviator equal rights and
remedies.
79. Supra. footnote No. 12.
80. Plool V. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188, 20 L. R. A. [n. s.] 152,
130 Am. St. Rep. 1072, 15 Ann. Cas. 1151 (1908)
81. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N. W. 221, 27
L. R. A. [n. s.] 312 (1910).
82. Bohlen, "Incomplete Privilege," 39 Rarv. L. Rev. 307 (1926).
